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A number of recent papers have documented that firms receive preferential 
treatments because of their political connections. In this paper, I study whether 
politically connected firms have received preferential treatment in bank financing 
and the impact of that on economic growth. Using a firm-level survey data of 
Chinese firms, I find that private firms with Party-leader General Managers are 
more likely to access bank loans, although there is little evidence that they get 
better loan terms regarding collateral requirements. Party membership alone does 
not induce favors from banks. On the other hand, General Managers’ involvement 
in the Party does not affect access to bank loans for SOEs. The positive 
relationship between political connections and bank loans for private firms also 
shows geographical differences in magnitude although qualitatively similar. The 
paper also provides suggestive evidence that bank credit extended to 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
The nexus between business and politics has been of keen interest for 
economists for many years. Faccio (2006) documents the prevalence of politically 
connected firms all over the world. These firms engage in rent seeking activities 
where they enhance their firm value by receiving preferential treatment from 
government like lighter taxation, better access to external financing and raw 
materials, relaxed regulatory oversight of the company in question, favorable 
position in competing for government contracts, and many other forms. 
 
 Despite the accumulating evidence on the economic rents enjoyed by 
politically connected firms, direct evidence linking political connection, finance 
and economic growth is still lacking in transition economies. Contemporary China 
offers a unique research setting to study interpenetration of bureaucrats and 
business people for several reasons. First, the transition economy is known for the 
underdevelopment of market institutions and significant distortions which makes 
the value of political connections potentially greater than other more developed 
economies. In China, the government controls critical resources and interferes 
heavily with economic activities. Second, the financial system in China is 
characterized by a large banking sector dominated by four big state-owned banks, 
which are known for their weak governance structure and inefficiency in credit 
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allocation. Third, even though the transition has moved far, state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs) and private firms coexist and will continue to do so in 
foreseeable future. Such backgrounds create an opportunity to study how political 
connections function with different types of enterprises. Studies on this topic have 
important policy implications.  
 
In this paper, I address two fundamental political economy questions: given 
the government ownership of banks, do banks favor politically connected firms? If 
so, is this lending behavior detrimental to economic growth? In the empirical 
analysis, I use a unique database based on the Investment Climate Survey, a major 
firm level survey conducted in early 2003 and led by the World Bank. The survey 
contains firm level information on bank financing across 18 cities. One of the 
strengths of the survey is its coverage of small and medium enterprises.  
 
This paper provides direct evidence of politically motivated lending at 
government-owned banks in a transition economy in the form of credit access for 
private firms whose general manager is a Party leader relative to those who are not. 
Running the same set of tests in two comparable samples of SOEs and private 
firms, I find that the higher chance for politically connected private firms to secure 
bank loans is robust to controlling for manager characteristics and firm attributes. 
This relation exists only for private firms and only when the General Manager is 
some sort of a Party leader, rather than just a Party member. In the comparable 
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SOE sample, however, neither leadership nor membership in the Party 
significantly influences bank behavior. Previous studies have proven that there 
exists a general bias towards SOEs in credit allocation (Cull and Xu, 2003). My 
findings extends their studies in that given the bias, the mechanism is not through 
Party involvement. My interpretation is that SOEs are connected with the 
government by strong ownership links that outplay the general involvement of 
managers in the Party (most general managers in SOEs are bureaucrats who 
assume some leadership position in the Party). Therefore, the connection through 
party participation becomes redundant. 
 
In further examination, I investigate the loan terms offered by the banks given 
the firm’s access to loans. The results are somewhat mixed. There is no clear 
evidence that politically connected firms enjoy better loan terms in regard to 
whether or not collateral is required and what percentage the collateral is to loan 
value. However, I cannot state with confidence that politically connected firms do 
not enjoy better loan terms without an examination of the interest rates charged 
which unfortunately I do not have usable information on.  
 
Considering the measure of political connection used in the paper is more 
sensitive to private firms, I subject them to subsample analysis by breaking down 
the sample of private firms to five regions (Coastal, Southwest, Central, 
Northwest, and Northeast) to investigate geographical heterogeneity within China. 
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The results show that the highest level of bank financing is in the Coastal (29%) 
and Southwest regions (22%) which Dollar et al. (2004) believe to have a more 
supportive investment climate that facilitates access to formal sources of external 
financing. Leadership position in the Party is positively associated with bank 
financing in Coastal, Central and Northeast region, positive but not significant in 
the Southwest region (Northwest has too few observations for regression analysis). 
This has confirmed my general finding while giving us a more nuanced picture of 
bank lending in different regions. Political connections measured by the level of 
participation in the Party serve as an effective mechanism to mitigate the less 
advantaged position of private firms in credit market. 
 
Finally, I link economic growth and connected lending on the provincial level. 
As I only have 15 provinces in the sample, regression analysis is somewhat 
compromised due to the sample size limitation. However, suggestive evidence 
shows that external financing (bank loans in this case) to non-connected private 
firms is positively related to GDP growth. This is quite an intriguing finding put in 
the context of political connections literature. As many prior work link political 
connections with economic benefits for connected firms, the direct evidence of 
adverse effects for the economy is less available with the exception like Khwaja & 
Mian (2005) who estimate the economy-wide cost of the rents from connected 
lending to be 0.3 to 1.9 percent of GDP every year in Pakistan. 
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The paper is organized as follows. The next chapter reviews relevant 
literature. Chapter 3 introduces data and methodology. Chapter 4 presents 
empirical evidence on the relationship between political connection, access to 




Chapter 2: Literature Review  
2.1 Political connections  
There is a growing economic literature studying the importance and the value 
of political connections. Political connections can help firms secure favorable 
regulatory conditions (Agrawal and Knoeber, 2001), pay lighter taxation (De Soto, 
1989), achieve higher firm values (Shleifer and Vishny, 1994; Fisman, 2001), and 
improve firm performance (Johnson and Mittion, 2003). One important channel 
for the government or politicians to bestow favors to politically connected firms is 
through better yet undeserved treatments in obtaining bank credit. Khwaja & Mian 
(2005) examine the universe of corporate lending in Pakistan and find that 
connected firms borrow 45 percent more and have 50 percent higher default rates. 
Such preferential treatment occurs exclusively in government banks. Charumilind, 
Kali, & Wiwattanakantang (2006) show that before the Asian financial crisis, 
connected firms need less collateral and obtain more long-term loans than those 
without connections in Thailand. Claessens, Feijen, & Laeven (2008) find that 
Brazilian firms which have contributed to federal deputies experienced higher 
stock returns around the 1998 and 2002 elections. Contributing firms also 
substantially increased their bank financing relative to a control group after each 
election. My study extends this literature in examining the largest emerging 




2.2 Politics and lending in China 
China’s growth remains a mystery for the finance and growth literature given 
the underdevelopment of financial markets and institutions. The Chinese financial 
system is characterized by a large banking sector, dominated by four big 
state-owned banks. In 2000, loans granted by these four banks account for 77% of 
the total bank credit extended (People’s Bank of China, 2001). As stated in Farrell 
et al. (2006), equity market capitalization, excluding non-tradable state-owned 
shares, is equivalent to just 17 percent of GDP, compared to 60 percent or more in 
other emerging markets and corporate bond issues by non-financial companies 
amount to just 1 percent of GDP, compared to an average of 50 percent in other 
emerging markets. Allen et al. (2005) suggest informal financing might be an 
important supplement. However, the private money houses and underground 
lending organizations charge very high interest rates and such conduct is 
technically illegal (Farrell et al. 2006). As a result, companies rely heavily and 
compete fiercely for bank loans.    
 
The pervasive state ownership of the banking sector in China has given rise to 
several serious problems including a huge ratio of non-performing loans to total 
loans, poor profitability, poor institutional framework of the banking system, 
weak corporate governance and reduced competitive pressure on the banks to 
operate as profit making enterprises (Ayyagari et al., 2007). SOEs continue to 
receive a disproportionately large share of the credit extended by the main banks 
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in China while the thriving private sector is credit constrained (Brandt and Li, 
2003). Recent empirical evidence shows that state banks have grown increasingly 
inefficient in allocating credit as they have been increasingly forced to bail out 
poorly performing SOEs (Lardy, 1998; Cull and Xu, 2003).  
 
Also, the credit market is inflicted by the information asymmetry between 
lenders and borrowers (Stiglitz & Weiss, 1981). It was less than 30 years since 
China’s private sector began to emerge with newly established and privatized 
SOEs. Thus most of China’s private enterprises are smaller and younger than their 
SOE counterparts and are more risky in the eyes of the lenders. In addition, with 
the potential threat of appropriation, private enterprises in China tend to disguise 
their actual economic gains, making it difficult for lenders to screen out good 
applicants from the bad. Third, the lack of quality credit rating services and 
information disclosure makes it hard to tell high quality firms. Thus, lending to 
SOEs seems a low-risk option. Given their government backing, it is acceptable if 
they default. 
 
Prior to the reform from the planned economy to a market economy, private 
firms were virtually nonexistent in the Chinese economy between 1952 and 1977. 
In the initial stage (late 1970s and the early 1980s) of private business 
development, the state remained ambivalent towards private business and imposed 
rigid restrictions on it. Since Deng Xiaoping’s Southern Tour of 1992, private 
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sector has experienced explosive growth and been acknowledged as an important 
part of the socialist market economy
1
. It has emerged as the most dynamic sector 
of the national economy employing nearly 50 percent of the work force and 
producing 60 percent of the industrial output by 2004 (Li et al., 2008).  
 
Despite the spectacular growth, private sector has been hampered by many 
institutional obstacles. Nee (1992) identifies weak market structures, poorly 
specified property rights, and institutional uncertainty as the characteristics of 
transition economy in China. These institutional impediments considerably 
increase the operating cost for private firms, and potentially threaten their survival 
and prosperity (De Soto, 1989). In the initial stage of development, private firms 
were considered an inferior ownership structure for ideological reasons. Most 
entrepreneurs were marginal people who were not able to get state jobs. Because 
of the historical political campaigns against capitalists, the society views them 
with prejudice and hostility. Until the early 1990s, private entrepreneurs were 
carefully controlled and denied entrance into the political establishment. Ideology 
has become less of a concern since early 1990s as the government attempted to 
raise the image of private business and acknowledge the important role played by 
the private sector in economic development.  
                                                 
1By the end of 1992, the report of the Fourteenth Party Congress stated that various types of ownership should 
develop together over a long period. The Fifteenth Party Congress in 1997 confirmed that the non-public 
sector is an important part of the socialist market economy and that individually owned businesses and private 
enterprises should be encouraged and developed. In the amended Constitution passed by the People’s 
National Congress in March 1999, the phrase that individually owned and private business is a “complement 




In spite of the ideological loosening, the environment faced by the private 
sector is unfavorable. Government officials in transition economies have been 
described as grabbing hands, preying on private businesses (Shleifer, 1997). In the 
absence of well-defined private property rights, private firms are subject to 
interventions like excessive regulations (red tape) and/or very high taxes and 
“extralegal” fees (Hellman et al., 2003; Guriev, 2004; McMillan and Woodruff, 
2002). Their access to capital and other factor markets is restricted given the 
government’s control of critical resources. It is still a long way to go before 
private business can compete fairly with SOEs. 
 
To compensate for the institutional disadvantage, private firms actively 
participate in politics to build connections with bureaucrats who can protect and 
bestow favors onto their businesses. Entrepreneurs use their wealth to gain entry 
into the political arena while government officials use their power to involve in 
market activities which gives rise to official profiteering, corruption and 
rent-seeking. Private firms with political connections can be rewarded by less 
levies, lighter taxation, oligopoly position and access to bank financing. The weak 
governance structure inside state-owned banks provides plenty of opportunities 
for bureaucrats to extend credit to politically connected firms instead of 
economically efficient ones. Therefore, firms spend significant resources to 
cultivate such connections with government officials as a compensation for the 
lack of formal institutional support (Xin and Pearce, 1996) or some government 
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officials even become entrepreneurs themselves to make direct use of their 
political capital. Choi and Zhou (2001) show that ex-cadre entrepreneurs, having 
political connections, achieve significantly higher profits compare with 




Chapter 3: Data and Variables 
3.1 Data 
The firm-level data set comes from the Investment Climate Survey, a major 
survey conducted in early 2003 and led by the World Bank (with the cooperation 
of the Enterprise Survey Organization of China). It covers 2,400 firms from 18 
cities, representatively located across five regions of China. Either 100 or 150 
firms were randomly sampled for each city from an electronic database of firms 
subject to the following constraints. First, firms are selected to ensure that both 
manufacturing and service industry firms are adequately represented. The industry 
coverage is as follows: for manufacturing, apparel and leather goods, electronic 
equipment, electronic components, consumer products, and vehicles and vehicle 
parts; for services, accounting and related services, advertising and marketing, 
business logistics services, communication services, and information technology 
services. Second, only firms that satisfy minimum size requirement (measured by 




A total of 18 cities were selected, representing five regions across China: (1) 
Northeast: Benxi, Changchun, Dalian, and Haerbin; (2) Coastal: Hangzhou, 
Jiangmen, Shenzhen, and Wenzhou; (3) Central: Changsha, Nanchang, Wuhan, 
                                                 
2 The minimum number of employees for firms in the sample is 20 in manufacturing industries and 15 in 
service industries. The size criterion was loosened when there were not enough firms from a particular sector 
in a city. As a result, roughly 3 percent of firms in our sample have less than 15 employees. 
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and Zhengzhou; (4) Southwest: Chongqing, Guiyang, Kunming, and Nanning; (5) 
Northwest: Lanzhou and Xi’ an.  
 
The questionnaire consists of two parts. Part one, based on interviews with 
the manager of a firm, contains questions on general information about the firm 
and the manager, innovation, market environment, relationships with clients and 
suppliers, location of manufacturing plant, relations with government, and 
international trade. Part two is based on interviews with the firm’s accountant and 
personnel manager, who provided quantitative information on production, costs, 
employee training, schooling, and wage. While most of the qualitative questions 
pertained only to the year 2002, many quantitative questions also requested 
information for 2000–2002. 
  
The survey also reports the legal status of the firm as (1) publicly traded or 
listed company; (2) non publicly-traded shareholding company; (3) private, 
non-listed company; (4) subsidiary/division of a domestic enterprise; (5) 
subsidiary/division of a multinational firm; (6) joint venture of a domestic 
enterprise; (7) joint venture of a multinational firm; (8)state owned company; (9) 




3.2 Dependent Variables 
My main dependent variable is Bankloan which takes the value of 1 if the 
firm states that it has a loan from a bank or financial institution and 0 if the firm 
states that it has no bank loan and no overdraft facility or line of credit. For all the 
firms in the sample, Coastal region has the highest percentage of firms with bank 
loans (30%), followed by Southwest (23%). A supplemental measure of access to 
bank credit is Numbank, which is a category variable of the number of banks that 
the firm do business with. The bigger the number, the more likely the firm has 
access to bank channeled funds. Loan terms are analyzed with three variables: 
Collateral takes the value of 1 if the firm is required to put collateral or deposit 
for the loan they get and 0 if the firm did not put collateral or deposit. Colvalue is 
the reported value of collateral required as a percentage of the loan value if 
collateral is required. Maturity is the average duration (measured in months) of 
long-term loans reported by firms. In the growth analysis, I use GDP growth rate 
in 2003 and 2004 as a measure of economic growth on provincial level. 
 
3.3 Measuring Political Connections  
General Managers can participate in politics in several ways in China: 
participation in formal political institutions such as the People’s Congress, 
participation in elections at the grassroots level, becoming active members in 
state-guided associations for private business and joining the Party. The 
continuance rule of the Chinese Communist Party makes Party membership 
almost a prerequisite for anyone who wants to enter politics. The attainment of 
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Party membership is a quite lengthy and extended selection process set by the 
Party. It generally takes five stages: (1) self-selection, (2) political participation, (3) 
daily monitoring, (4) closed door evaluation, and (5) probationary examination 
(Bian et al., 2001). The whole process could take years to complete for a close 
examination of the applicant’s political loyalty as well as superior quality like 
work ability, interpersonal skills and persistence. Private business owners were 
originally denied from the Party as the Party claimed to represent the working 
class of poor peasants and workers. The economic reform loosens ideology; 
however, the criteria for private business owners to participate were very strict 
and successful cases were rare. It was not until the Party’s Sixteenth Congress in 
2002, when formal rights for private business owners to apply for Party 
membership were granted.  
 
The survey has information on the involvement of the General Managers in 
the Party. I categorize three levels of involvement: (1) Party leader; (2) Party 
member; (2) Non Party member (meaning no direct involvement). Party Leader 
is a dummy variable coded as 1 if the manager holds some leadership position in 
the party including party secretary, deputy party secretary or party committee 
member or executive member. Party Member is a dummy variable coded as 1 if 
the manager is a member of the party and 0 if he is not a member. Party Leader is 
a subset of Party Member as all party leaders are by definition party members. For 
the private sector, the General Manager could start/join the business before or 
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after he/she joins the Party. After Deng Xiaoping’s Southern Tour of 1992, more 
and more Party members and government employees quit their Party/government 
posts to enter the promising private sector. One important reason for the turnover 
is to leverage their connections with key Party and government officials. Either 
case, the Party leader/member identity indicates close personal and political ties 
with the Party.  
 
Table 1 presents a distribution of firms with bank loans and those with a Party 
leader. All firms fall in one of the four categories: (1) politically connected and 
has a bank loan, (2) not connected but has a bank loan, (3) politically connected 
without a bank loan, and (4) not connected, no loan. All rows add up to 1 for each 
city. In Central, Northeast and Northwest, banks seem to favor politically 
connected firms more obviously judging from percentages.  
 
3.4 Control Variables 
Chinese private business is characterized by high ownership concentration 
and the manager is often the majority owner of the firm. For smaller and younger 
private enterprises, top managers play a vital role in the firm’s survival and 
prosperity. Managers generally offer two types of resources: human capital as 
indicated by their experience (Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven, 1990; McGee et al., 
1995) and social capital as indicated by their externalities (Granovetter, 1985; 
Shane and Cable, 2002). The questionnaire contains information about the 
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background of the general manager. For my purpose, I constructed two variables 
to measure the human capital of the General Manager. Education is a dummy 
coded as 1 when the General Manger has a college degree or above and 0 
otherwise. Managerial Experience is the number of years served as a General 
Manager in any company.  
 
Firms with good performance should have better access to bank loans. My 
measures of growth opportunities and firm performance are Sales Growth 
[1999-2000] and ROA. Sales growth is computed as the percentage change in 
firm sales from 1999 to 2000. ROA is measured as EBIT over the book value of 
total assets in 2000.  
 
I construct Size as the natural logarithm of total book assets in 2000. Size may 
be positively related to reputation and the level of firm-specific information 
disclosure to the public (Diamond, 1991). Also, larger firms may be less risky.  
Leverage is calculated as the book value of total liabilities over the book value of 
total assets in 2000 as an indicator of the financial situation of the firm. Age is 
included in natural logarithm in the regression as older firms may be considered 
less risky as it has already built up a certain track record.  
 
Length is the number of years that the firm has done business with its 
primary bank. The longer the relationship, the less information asymmetry there 
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should be (Petersen and Rajan, 1994). China does not have a credible credit rating 
service, so I utilize an alternative measure called Audit which takes the value of 1 
if the firm has its financial statement audited every year. It is an indicator of the 
credibility of the financial statement which should make it easier for credit 
analysts to screen out good applicants from bad ones.  
 
Region indicators represent five regions of China: Coastal, Central, Northeast, 
Northwest and Southwest. Southwest is the reference category. I also include nine 
Industry dummy variables representing ten industry sectors.  
 
3.5 Methodology 
The empirical analysis in this paper consists of two parts. First, whether 
politically connected firms get preferential treatment in bank financing. In the 
regression analysis that follows, my basic regression model is: 
 
BANK LOAN/COLLATERALit = αi + β1 [POLITICAL CONNECTIONS]it + β2 
[FIRM CHARACTERISTIC]it-1 + β3 [MANAGER CHARACTERISTICS]it + β4 
[INDUSTRY  EFFECTS]it +β5[REGION  INDICATOR] it  + εit     
 
Logistic regression is the main estimation method, and all the quantitative 
measures on the right hand side of the equation enter the regression in lags to 
mitigate simultaneity issues. SOEs and private, non-listed firms are singled out 
from the whole sample for analysis in this part. Ownership is a complicated issue 
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in China. Apart from the clear contrast of SOEs and private firms, there is a grey 
area of various types of firms whose ownership cannot be clearly identified. SOEs 
and private firms together account for 55% of all firms out of 2400. The rest 8 
types account for 45%. I do not have detailed information on ownership of these 8 
types. For example, collective firm is actually a hybrid ownership form which 
appeared early in transition and will probably go to extinction as transition 
progresses. So I include SOEs and private firms for a clean test. There are 676 
private firms and 635 SOEs in the sample, but the number is reduced due to 
missing data in the regression analysis.   
 
For the growth analysis, I use a residual plot method to partial out the effect 
of non-connected lending to private firms on economic growth. The procedure 
will be detailed in section 4.5. 
 
3.6 Summary Statistics 
Table 2 reports sample statistics for main variables used in the regressions 
and reveals some interesting differences between SOEs and private firms. Panel A 
starts with the statistics for financing variables. The table shows that 20% of 
private firms have access to bank loans compared with 23 % of SOEs. SOEs also 
do business with more banks and put a lower level of collateral. In Panel B, I 
provide the summary statistics for the political connections variables. Private 
firms have a much lower ratio in both Party leader and Party membership. 17% of 
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private firm managers are Party leaders and 43% are Party members while the 
corresponding figures for SOEs are 71% and 90%. Panel C pertains to firm-level 
control variables, where I always use lagged data for quantitative variables to 
mitigate simultaneity concerns. Table 2 also highlights the performance difference 
between private firms and SOEs. Private firms grow faster (123% for the mean 
private firms, as opposed to 35% of SOEs) and enjoy a higher ROA (4% for mean 
private firms, compared with -1% for mean SOE). SOEs also have higher leverage, 
longer relationship with banks, more credible financial statements, more educated 










Chapter 4: Main findings 
 
4.1 Access to Bank Loans and Political Connections 
In this subsection, I examine the effect of political connections on access to 
bank loans. If as I argued earlier that Party leadership/membership is an important 
political connection in China, it might help firms to gain access to the credit 
market.  
 
Table 3 shows Pearson correlation coefficients between dependent variables 
and main independent variables. In the private sample, all four dependent 
variables are positively correlated with Party leader and Party member. The 
correlations between Party leader and Bankloan, Collateral and Numbank are 
statistically significant. So does Party member and Colvalue. In the SOE sample, 
Party leader positively and significantly correlated with Bankloan, Collateral, and 
Numbank. So does Party member and Bankloan.  
 
Table 4 presents logistic regression for the hypothesis that leadership position 
in the Party leads to preferential access to bank loans. I regress Bankloan, the 
existence of bank loans on two dummy variables-Party leadership and Party 
membership respectively. The coefficient measures the impact of political 
connections on obtaining bank loans. A positive (negative) value means that 
politically connected firms are more (less) likely to get bank loans. I also include 
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several regressors to control for firm and manager characteristics. Because I do 
not have accounting data for some firms, the size of the sample decreases a little 
in both private and SOE sample. Finally, I control for industry and region effects. 
Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are shown in parentheses.  
 
Column 1 in Table 4 reports the estimates of the existence of bank loans 
regressed on Party leadership position and all control variables. Manager being a 
Party leader significantly increases the firm’s chance to get bank loans. Size also 
has positive effects meaning bigger firms are more likely to get bank loans. This is 
consistent with the literature that large firms are less risky and young firms suffer 
from liability of newness and smallness. Education has a negative effect on bank 
loans which is confusing. My speculation is that manager’s human capital is not as 
important as social capital in doing business in China. Audit has a positive and 
significant effect as it is a strong mitigation of the information asymmetry 
problem prevalent between banks and private firms. None of the performance 
measures is significant, confirming the lack of efficiency in credit allocation. 
Column 2 shows that Party member has a positive but insignificant effect on bank 
loans. Bank credit is a scarce resource especially when financial market is 
underdeveloped, thus, the extension of bank credit is not only influenced by the 
existence of political connection but also by the strength of the connection. Being 
a Party leader is more powerful than being a Party member. In Column 3, I put 
both Party leader and Party member into the regression as a robustness check. 
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Party leader is still significant. Column 4-6 reports the same set of regression in 
SOEs, neither Party leader nor Party member is significant. As shown in the 
summary statistics, general managers in SOEs are almost by default party 
members and a large majority of them are Party leaders which makes such 
connections common and value-reduced.  
 
Next, I use a less direct measure of access to bank credit-the number of banks 
that the firm do business with. Ideally, more banks suggest a higher possibility of 
obtaining bank loans. I do not use the number of banks directly, but constructed a 
variable Numbank from it. Numbank is defined as 0 when the firm answers 0, 1 
when the firm’s answer is between 1 and 3, and 2 if the answer is bigger than 3. 
This measure subjects to some noise in that firms that have a reliable access to one 
or two particular banks may not need to develop relationship with more banks as it 
is costly and time-consuming for both the firm and the bank. The firm needs to 
signal its quality and the bank needs to screen and monitor. So it is highly possible 
that there is an optimum number of banks, not the more, the better. Table 5 gives 
the ordered logit regression of category on political connections. Party leader and 
Party member appear to be positive in all regressions but only Party leader is 
significant in SOE sample. Younger and bigger firms tend to have business 
relations with more banks. 
 
In summary, the results support the notion that in the context of China, 
political connection is an important mechanism to mitigate the adverse 
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environment that private firms face and help them to access critical resources like 
external finance. Chinese private entrepreneurs who are well-connected with the 
Party and the government are more likely than those without these ties to be able 
to obtain favorable treatment from it, such as securing bank loans. On the other 
hand, Party affiliation is very common among SOE managers. They are almost by 
default Party members and many of them are bureaucrats. It is therefore hard to 
detect the effects of Party affiliation for SOEs. 
 
4.2 Loan Terms: Collateral and Maturity 
In this subsection, I study the effect of political connections on the terms of 
bank loans given that the firm has a loan. More specifically, I test whether 
collateral is required for obtaining the loan, the amount of the collateral required 
as a percentage of loan value and the maturity of the loan. These tests help us to 
understand in more detail in what ways political connections work.  
 
I basically redo the tests specified in the Bankloan regression in Table 4 with 
collateral as the dependent variable. To avoid simultaneity issues, I single out 
firms which had a recent loan, meaning that the loan was approved in 2001 or 
2002. As our independent variables are mostly of the year 2000, any loan 
approved before that is not suitable to be included in the regression. This 
procedure plus missing data reduce the sample to less than half of the original. 
Table 6 show the result of the logistic regression of collateral on political 
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connections. Negative (positive) value on the coefficients mean that it is less 
(more) likely banks ask for collateral. The sign of Party leader and Party member 
in private firms are negative, but none is significant. Party member, however, has 
a positive effect in SOE sample.  
  
Next, in Table 7, I investigate the impact of political connections on collateral 
value with an OLS regression. The dependent variable is the collateral value as a 
percentage to the loan value. The sample is further reduced to about 130 due to 
missing data on the basis of the sample used in the previous regression. Political 
connections do not affect collateral value in SOEs. Neither does Party leader in 
the private sample; however, Party member has a positive effect on collateral 
value. Besides this, older firms managed by more experienced managers tend to 
put less collateral. 
 
 Finally, in Table 8, I study the effect of political connections on the duration 
of long-term loan. We can see from the result that Party leader and Party member 
have a negative sign in both the private firm sample and SOE sample. However, 
none of these are significant. From summary statistics, the mean of Maturity in the 
private sample is 18.24 months, which is significantly lower than the SOE sample 
mean of 30.05 months. So banks tend to extend longer-term loans to SOEs in 
general, and political connections do not seem to be of vital importance in the 




In summary, there is no definite evidence that politically connected firms 
have been treated more favorably in loan terms regarding collateral requirement 
and maturity. The banks might think the extension of credit is already a big favor 
given the highly competitive market for getting bank loans. Besides, the default 
rate is quite high in China, so the banks might hold on to collateral as a 
self-protection mechanism.  
 
4.3 Subsample Analysis: Firms with External Financing Needs 
In this survey, firms are requested to give reasons why they do not apply for 
loans in the survey. The firms report six reasons for not applying for a loan: Do 
not need loans, Application procedures for bank loans are too cumbersome, 
Collateral requirements of bank loans are too stringent, Did not expect to be 
approved, Interest rates are too high, and Corruption in the allocation of bank 
credit. The reasons reported are not mutually exclusive. If a firm really does not 
need bank loans, my measure Bankloan may subject from some noise that the firm 
might be able to get bank loans but choose not to, which is not very economically 
rational as bank financing is cheaper comparing to other external sources. 
Nevertheless, I drop the firms that claim they do not need loans from the sample. 
This should give us a cleaner test of the access hypothesis.  
  
Table 9 presents the results of the logistic regression with firms that need 
loans. The specification is the same as in Table 4. The results are qualitatively 
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similar to Table 4. Party leader has a significant positive impact on access to bank 
loans in private firms.  
 
4.4 Subsample Analysis: Firms in Different Regions 
In this subsection, I examine the effect of political connections on the access 
to credit for private firms in different localities. I split the private-firm sample to 
five geographic regions and test the access hypothesis separately in each region. 
My intention is to see if there are any regional differences in bank behavior 
responding to political connections. In the theory, the effects should be greater in 
regions with weaker institutions.  
 
Table 10 shows that Party leader have strong positive effects on access to 
bank loans in Coastal, Central and Northeast region. Northwest region has too few 
observations, but previous summary statistics show that the effect is strong in 
Northwest, so the only exception is Southwest with a positive but not significant 
effect. I have also regressed Bankloan on Party member in private firms (results 
not reported), only in Northeast is the coefficient positively significant. In general, 
the results confirm the positive relation between Party leadership and access to 
bank loans. The strength of this relationship, however, seems to be different 
across regions with strongest effect in Northeast, and weakest in Southwest. 
Coastal and Southwest regions are believed to have better institutions (Dollar et 
al., 2004) and they enjoy the highest level of bank financing in private sector 
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(29% and 21% respectively) while Northeast has the lowest level of bank 
financing in private firms (14%). it is not surprising that the Southwest has a weak 
effect. What seems a little mysterious is the strong effect of Party leader in 
Coastal region, the most economically developed and open region. So far, I have 
not come up with a satisfactory explanation of this phenomenon, which leaves it 
an interesting question for future research. 
 
4.5 Robustness Check: Heckman’s Lambda Approach 
In this part, I provide some further robustness check to my base results. It is 
difficult to establish causality in a cross-sectional study. One might suspect that 
both political connections as well as access to bank loans are somewhat related to 
a time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity by difference in firm capability 
(Managerial capability). This is a valid concern and I tackle this problem with 
Heckman’s lambda approach. First, I run a probit regression to predict the 
likelihood that a firm has political connections. The result is in Table 11. Party 
leader is used as the dependent variable. If the CEO is a Party leader, then this 
firm is identified as having political connections. I try two specifications: Column 
(1) regresses Party leader on log of firm age, years of managerial experience of 
the CEO and the education level of the CEO. Column (2) regresses Party leader 
on log of firm assets, years of managerial experience of CEO and the education 





Then I obtain the predicted probability (Heckman’s lambda) of a firm having 
political connection from the two specifications respectively (P1 and P2). In the 
following analysis, I rerun all the critical regressions in the paper with P1 included 
as an independent variable. (I also run the same regressions with P2, but the 
results are qualitatively the same, so only regressions with P1 are reported here.)  
 
Table 12 presents the results of regressions with five different dependent 
variables with Heckman’s Lambda. Column (1) shows that Party leader is still 
highly significant in helping private firms to get bank loans. This proves the 
robustness of our primary results in the original paper that political connections do 
induce favorable treatment from state-owned banks. Column (2) corresponds to 
Table 5. The result is consistent that Party leader is positive but insignificant in 
explaining the number of banks that firms do business with. Column (3), 
corresponding to Table 6, investigates whether collateral is required in obtaining 
bank loans. In Table 6, the coefficient of Party leader is negative and insignificant 
but here it is positive and significant. This is the only inconsistency after applying 
Heckman’s lambda approach. Column (4) on collateral value (corresponding to 
Table 7) and Column (5) (corresponding to Table8) on maturity of long-term 





4.6 Growth Analysis 
Many economists believe that the development of financial system is a robust 
determinant of long run economic growth (see Levine, 1997; Rajan and Zingales, 
1998; Levine et al., 2000). McMillan and Woodruff (2002) conjecture that as the 
transition progresses, market supporting institutions will take increasingly 
important role. The ultimate goal of a well-functioning financial system is to 
reallocate capital to projects with highest returns. Yet, plenty of evidence shows 
that the process of allocating financial resources is distorted by various factors 
other than economic merit. Take banks for example, in most countries, banks are 
the single most important source of external financing. La Porta et al. (2002) 
document that government ownership of banks is very common outside the United 
States which makes them vulnerable to bend over to political concerns. Dinc 
(2005) shows that government-owned banks increase their lending in election 
years relative to private banks. Sapienza (2004) finds that the interest rates 
charged by government-owned banks in Italy reflect the local power of the party 
that controls the bank.  
 
Economic policies and political support are endogeneous (Krueger, 1993). 
Political support of special intersts influence policy making which casts out 
opposing forces and results in long run economic deterioration. According to 
Hellman et al. (2003) a capture economy has emerged in many transition 
economies, where rent-generating advantages are sold by public officials and 
politicians to private firms. State capture is associated with social costs in the form 
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of weaker economy-wide firm performance. Morck et al. (2005) also reviews 
evidence that economic entrenchment affects rates of innovation, economywide 
resource allocation, and economic growth. One way for the interest group to 
continue their economic dominance is to control financial resources or even 
oppose financial development. In their study of the financial development of 
twentieth century, Rajan and Zingales (2003) suggest that incumbents, in the 
financial sector and in industry, use financial repression as a way to protect 
incumbent rent and to batter the entry of new comers.  
 
Private sector is clearly the engine of economic growth in China. However, 
they have not been treated fairly in the market. The results above show that 
politically-connected private firms are more likely to get loans. Is this allocation 
of financial resources efficient? In other words, is it good or bad for economic 
growth? To tackle this problem, I construct a variable X, which is defined as the 
percentage of private firms that have bank loans but without political connections.  
 
There are 18 cities belonging to 15 provinces in the sample. So I did a 
provincial level study. Three growth measures are used: (1) average sales growth 
rate from 2001 to 2002 in a province; (2) GDP growth rate in 2003; (3) GDP 
growth rate in 2004. I regress the three measures on X, controlling for GDP per 
capita 2002. Table 13 shows that X has significant positive influence for sales 
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growth after controlling for GDP per capita. GDP per capita is a strong predictor 
of GDP growth. X is positively related to GDP growth, but not significant.  
 
To further partial out the effects of X on growth, the following procedures are 
applied. 
 (1) Regress GDP growth rate in 2003 and 2004 on GDP per capita in 2002 
and obtain the residuals from this regression. Res1 are the residuals obtained from 
regressing GDP growth rate in 2003 while Res2 are the residuals of 2004.  
(2) Regress X on GDP per capita in 2002 and obtain the residuals-Res3 from 
the regression.  
(3) Regress Res1 and Res2 on Res3 and plot the relationship as shown in 
Figure 1 and Figure 2. 
 
From the two figures, we can see that Res1 and Res2 tend to be positively 
associated with Res3, which translates into the fact that non-connected lending 
tends to be positively related to GDP growth. Though the results here are only 
indicative due to the small sample size, I propose that the bank credit extended to 
connected firms are not very efficient. Wurgler (2000) has provided evidence that 
sound capital institutions and markets, effectively check capital misallocation. In 
China’s case, the mechanism of banking system seems to hamper the efficient 
allocation of capital. Allocating more credit to non-connected private firms might 
be a way to further stimulate economic growth. When political considerations 
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outweigh competition and efficiency, it generally implies welfare loss to the 
society. The largest financial gains were often made by those linked to the 
party-state bureaucracy, not by those individuals who work independently of the 
state. The close relationship between power and money has created new vested 
interests, which may block further loosening of state power. The 
underdevelopment of a fair and open market could do real harm as China’s 








Chapter 5: Conclusion 
 
Literature has suggested that external financing-bank loans in particular, is an 
important channel for connected firms benefit from political favors. This paper 
corroborates other studies by adding a piece of evidence in the biggest transition 
economy where the government still possesses considerable control over the 
allocation of critical resources and political connections are extremely valuable. I 
found robust evidence that for private firms, the General Manager being a Party 
leader helps the firm to access bank loans. Membership in the Party alone does not 
have much effect on obtaining bank loans.  The study has not found direct 
evidence that politically connected private firms have got better loan terms like 
collateral requirement and duration of loans, nor do they have access to more 
banks. In the growth analysis, the paper offers preliminary proof that 
non-connected lending is beneficial to economic growth. 
 
There are many interesting questions that could be explored along the line of 
this paper. For example, the paper only documents the effect of formal political 
connections by Party involvement. Political connections can exist in various ways 
depending on the economic and social environment of the country studied. Future 
research may reveal other formal/informal kinds of political connections and how 
they work in different times and situations. Because this study only has cross 
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section data, it was not possible to see the evolution of the nexus between power 
and money. Also, most studies focus on the benefits of political connections; we 
could expand the understanding of political economy by documenting the 
liabilities encountered by connected firms. Finally, the paper detects some 
geographical difference in the politically-connected lending which deserves a 
more thorough and careful study of their reasons and implications for financial 
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Table 1. Bank loans and Party leadership positions of general managers 
The table gives the distribution of bank loans and Party leader managers in 18 cities 
respectively. Column 1 presents firms that have a bank loan and the general manager is a 
Party leader and Column 2 are firms that have a bank loan and the general manager is not 
a Party leader.  
 Bank loan No bank loan 






Southwest    
Chongqing 0.188 0.154 0.221 0.436 
Guiyang 0.076 0.110 0.398 0.415 
Kunming 0.100 0.193 0.329 0.379 
Nanning 0.052 0.074 0.281 0.593 
     
Coastal     
Hangzhou 0.237 0.206 0.206 0.351 
Jiangmen 0.061 0.071 0.286 0.582 
Shenzhen 0.097 0.151 0.237 0.516 
Wenzhou 0.084 0.274 0.021 0.621 
     
Central     
Changsha 0.127 0.070 0.331 0.472 
Nanchang 0.137 0.137 0.331 0.396 
Wuhan 0.134 0.054 0.336 0.477 
Zhengzhou 0.074 0.094 0.255 0.577 
     
Northeast     
Benxi 0.128 0.053 0.447 0.372 
Changchun 0.097 0.069 0.396 0.438 
Dalian 0.182 0.136 0.295 0.386 
Haerbin 0.079 0.057 0.457 0.407 
     
Northwest     
Lanzhou 0.101 0.076 0.361 0.462 












 Table 2. Summary statistics of main variables 
This table presents summary statistics for the private firm sample and the SOE 
sample. Length, Firm age, and Managerial experience enter in natural logarithm.  
  Private   SOE  
Variable  Obs.  Mean  sd.  Obs.  Mean  sd. 
Panel A: dependent variables 
Bankloan 623 0.20 0.40 596 0.23 0.42 
Collateral 623 0.33 0.47 596 0.35 0.48 
Colvalue 201 78.82 47.27 201 71.17 46.80 
Numbank 676 1.11 0.40 635 1.26 0.51 
Maturity 249 18.57 15.24 273 30.21 23.96 
 
Panel B: Political connections variables 
Party leader 623 0.17 0.37 596 0.71 0.45 
Party member 623 0.43 0.50 596 0.90 0.30 
 
Panel C: Control variables 
Sales growth [1999-2000] 583 1.23 4.55 575 0.35 1.28 
ROA [2000] 622 0.04 0.22 595 -0.01 0.11 
Leverage [2000] 622 0.56 0.31 596 0.65 0.33 
Length (log) 618 1.81 0.60 584 2.53 0.85 
Audit 623 0.55 0.50 596 0.81 0.39 
Firm age (log) 623 1.98 0.51 595 2.98 0.86 
Size 622 8.37 1.69 596 10.63 1.99 
Education 623 0.77 0.42 596 0.90 0.29 












Table 3. Pearson correlation coefficients between bank finance and political 
connections 
This table reports correlations between bankloan, collateral, colvalue, numbank and 
political connections for private firms and SOEs. P-values are reported between brackets.  
Panel A. Private Firms  
Variable Bankloan  Collateral Colvalue Numbank  Party leader 
Collateral 0.52     
 (0.00)     
Colvalue 0.07 .    
 (0.31) (0.00)    
Numbank 0.10 0.19 0.06   
 (0.01) (0.00) (0.42)   
Party leader 0.14 0.11 0.05 0.08  
 (0.00) (0.01) (0.44) (0.05)  
Party member 0.01 0.02 0.18 0.05 0.51 
 (0.78) (0.60) (0.01) (0.19) (0.00) 
 
Panel B. SOEs 
Variable Bankloan  Collateral Colvalue Numbank  Party leader 
Collateral 0.38     
 (0.00)     
Colvalue 0.03 .    
 (0.64) (0.00)    
Numbank 0.23 0.21 -0.08   
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.29)   
Party leader 0.11 0.07 -0.04 0.10  
 (0.01) (0.10) (0.58) (0.02)  
Party member 0.07 0.04 0.00 0.06 0.51 




Table 4. Impact of political connections on access to bank loans 
The dependent variable Bankloan is a dummy variable which takes the value of one 
if the firm has a bank loan as of early 2003. Party leader (member) is a dummy variable 
equal to one if the general manager is a Party leader (member). Sales growth is the 
percentage change in sales from 1999 to 2000.  ROA is EBIT over total assets in 2000. 
Leverage is total liabilities over total assets in 2000. I measure the size of the firm by 
logarithm of total assets in 2000. Log length is the natural logarithm of the years that the 
firm has done business with its primary bank. Audit is a dummy variable which takes the 
value of one if the firm has its financial statement audited every year. Log firm age is the 
natural logarithm of the years that the firm has been founded. Education is a dummy 
variable that takes the value of one if the general manager has a college degree or above. 
Log experience is the natural logarithm of the number of years that the general manger 
has been a general manager in any firm. All regressions include industry and region 
dummies. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are in brackets. ***, **, * indicate 
statistically significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. Model (1)-(3) reports 
the results for private firms. Model (4)-(6) report the results for SOEs. LR-test is a 
statistic to test the hypothesis that all the explanatory variables are jointly zero. 
          Bankloan   
  Private   SOE  
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Party leader 1.005***  1.164*** 0.156  0.0144 
 (0.297)  (0.367) (0.276)  (0.317) 
Party member  0.309 -0.223  0.445 0.434 
  (0.239) (0.303)  (0.443) (0.509) 
Sales growth -0.00125 0.00325 -0.00126 -0.009 -0.008 -0.008 
 (0.0256) (0.0269) (0.0253) (0.094) (0.0937) (0.0939) 
ROA 0.646 0.653 0.633 1.018 0.964 0.966 
 (0.445) (0.442) (0.444) (1.039) (1.016) (1.015) 
Leverage 0.0979 0.0577 0.0995 0.0958 0.0955 0.0951 
 (0.405) (0.402) (0.404) (0.365) (0.363) (0.363) 
Log length -0.0885 -0.0381 -0.0821 0.0950 0.0966 0.0958 
 (0.195) (0.194) (0.197) (0.152) (0.153) (0.152) 
Audit 0.434* 0.486** 0.437* -0.111 -0.112 -0.112 
 (0.231) (0.228) (0.230) (0.305) (0.305) (0.306) 
Log firm age -0.173 -0.0738 -0.182 0.368** 0.368** 0.367** 
 (0.258) (0.253) (0.258) (0.161) (0.160) (0.160) 















-0.605 -0.630 -0.632 
 (0.288) (0.299) (0.292) (0.420) (0.415) (0.416) 
Log experience 0.179 0.240 0.178 0.226 0.225 0.225 
 (0.239) (0.235) (0.238) (0.172) (0.172) (0.172) 
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Table 4. 
(continued) 
      
Industry effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Region indicator Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 525 525 525 545 545 545 
































Table 5. Impact of political connections on the number of banks  
The dependent variable Numbank is a categorical variable which takes the value 0 if 
a firm does not do business with any bank; 1 if a firm does business with one to three 
banks; 2 if a firm does business with more than three banks. Ordered logit model is used 
for estimation. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are in brackets. ***, **, * 
indicate statistically significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. Wald-test is a 
statistic to test the hypothesis that all the explanatory variables are jointly zero. Model 
(1)-(3) reports the results for private firms. Model (4)-(6) report the results for SOEs.  
   Numbank   
  Private   SOE  
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Party leader 0.502  0.434 0.547**  0.450 
 (0.353)  (0.414) (0.255)  (0.286) 
Party member  0.274 0.101  0.628 0.291 
  (0.252) (0.297)  (0.439) (0.500) 
Sales growth 0.0131 0.0147 0.0130 -0.0589 -0.0508 -0.058 
 (0.0256) (0.0259) (0.0258) (0.0668) (0.0659) (0.0668) 
ROA 0.895** 0.898** 0.903** -1.792* -2.020** -1.849* 
 (0.429) (0.426) (0.432) (0.933) (0.948) (0.950) 
Leverage 0.314 0.309 0.314 0.0374 0.0324 0.0350 
 (0.370) (0.370) (0.371) (0.370) (0.372) (0.372) 
Log length 1.300*** 1.311*** 1.297*** 0.586*** 0.607*** 0.585*** 
 (0.371) (0.372) (0.372) (0.224) (0.222) (0.223) 
Audit 0.754*** 0.754*** 0.750*** 0.256 0.280 0.262 
 (0.278) (0.278) (0.279) (0.292) (0.292) (0.294) 













 (0.343) (0.343) (0.344) (0.175) (0.174) (0.175) 
Size 0.331*** 0.338*** 0.331*** 0.459*** 0.473*** 0.461*** 
 (0.0964) (0.0947) (0.0964) (0.0646) (0.0635) (0.0646) 
Education 0.129 0.121 0.120 -0.116 -0.0894 -0.135 
 (0.309) (0.315) (0.313) (0.431) (0.433) (0.434) 
Log experience 0.0163 0.0263 0.0156 -0.341** -0.328** -0.342** 
 (0.250) (0.248) (0.249) (0.165) (0.165) (0.166) 
       
Industry effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Region indicator Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 577 577 577 563 563 563 
p-value of 
Wald-test 




Table 6. Impact of political connections on the requirement of collateral 
The dependent variable Collateral is a dummy variable which takes the value of 1 if 
the firm is required to put collateral in obtaining the bank loans. Heteroskedasticity-robust 
standard errors are in brackets. ***, **, * indicate statistically significant at the 1%, 5%, 
and 10% level, respectively. Wald-test is a statistic to test the hypothesis that all the 
explanatory variables are jointly zero. Model (1)-(2) reports the results for private firms. 
Model (3)-(4) report the results for SOEs. 
  Collateral 
 Private  SOE 
Variable (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
Party leader -0.0359   0.369  
 (0.457)   (0.423)  
Party member  -0.0733   1.422** 
  (0.380)   (0.657) 
Sales growth 0.305* 0.304*  0.502 0.474 
 (0.177) (0.176)  (0.324) (0.33) 
ROA 0.794 0.781  -2.847 -3.502 
 (0.969) (0.952)  (2.219) (2.287) 
Leverage -0.174 -0.158  -0.620 -0.600 
 (0.626) (0.643)  (0.627) (0.638) 
Log length 0.406 0.406  0.0397 0.0219 
 (0.386) (0.382)  (0.253) (0.248) 
Audit 0.764** 0.768**  0.335 0.319 
 (0.386) (0.385)  (0.528) (0.529) 
Log firm age -0.220 -0.219  0.0967 0.0508 
 (0.481) (0.488)  (0.255) (0.260) 
Size 0.213* 0.211*  -0.0263 -0.0331 
 (0.117) (0.117)  (0.108) (0.109) 
Education 0.185 0.200  -0.0644 -0.0756 
 (0.456) (0.460)  (0.610) (0.618) 
Log experience -0.118 -0.117  -0.174 -0.212 
 (0.360) (0.360)  (0.270) (0.274) 
Constant -1.617 -1.591  -0.982 -1.663 
 (1.464) (1.476)  (1.739) (1.684) 
      
Industry effects Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Region indicator Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Observations 208 208  206 206 







Table 7. Impact of political connections on the value of collateral required as 
percentage of loan value 
The dependent variable Colvalue is the value of collateral required as percentage of 
loan value. OLS regression is used. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are in 
brackets. ***, **, * indicate statistically significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, 
respectively. Model (1)-(2) reports the results for private firms. Model (3)-(4) report the 
results for SOEs. 
 Colvalue  
 Private SOE 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Party leader 2.953  1.984  
 (11.05)  (12.30)  
Party member  18.53*  25.21 
  (9.631)  (34.39) 
Sales growth -0.989 -1.032 0.969 0.888 
 (1.228) (1.166) (7.675) (7.764) 
ROA 16.00 14.09 14.34 6.477 
 (17.45) (19.13) (80.49) (79.36) 
Leverage 2.849 -1.120 9.941 9.871 
 (17.81) (17.67) (18.40) (17.82) 
Log length 8.281 8.204 -1.943 -1.831 
 (10.77) (10.38) (9.019) (8.648) 
Audit 8.340 5.241 11.69 13.76 
 (9.833) (9.550) (12.55) (12.53) 
Log firm age -19.85** -20.73** 1.293 1.061 
 (9.157) (9.013) (7.969) (8.025) 
Size -0.292 0.402 -2.321 -2.315 
 (3.531) (3.317) (3.276) (3.316) 
Education -4.569 -7.647 -2.736 -4.859 
 (12.55) (12.54) (14.83) (14.39) 
Log experience -14.49* -15.21* 8.585 7.689 
 (8.157) (7.933) (7.126) (6.966) 
     
Industry effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Region indicator Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 130 130 128 128 




Table 8. Impact of political connections on the maturity of long-term loan 
The dependent variable Maturity is the average duration (measured in months) of 
long-term loans reported by firms. OLS regression is used. Heteroskedasticity-robust 
standard errors are in brackets. ***, **, * indicate statistically significant at the 1%, 5%, 
and 10% level, respectively. Model (1)-(3) reports the results for private firms. Model 
(4)-(6) report the results for SOEs. 
  Private   SOE  
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Party leader -2.291  -1.766 -1.363  1.183 
 (2.205)  (2.749) (4.401)  (2.776) 
Party member  -1.615 -0.818  -9.155 -9.993 
  (1.891) (2.348)  (12.24) (11.86) 
Sales growth 0.378 0.380 0.385 -0.984 -0.488 -0.549 
 (0.270) (0.258) (0.269) (2.528) (2.317) (2.308) 
ROA -1.012 -1.249 -1.102 -18.89 -16.02 -14.92 
 (2.609) (2.671) (2.595) (15.30) (12.24) (12.68) 
Leverage 5.322 5.428 5.369 -5.177 -5.277 -5.102 
 (3.531) (3.548) (3.543) (8.736) (8.441) (8.539) 
Log length -0.415 -0.447 -0.368 1.228 1.248 1.156 
 (1.311) (1.298) (1.308) (2.009) (2.061) (2.039) 
Audit 4.194** 4.175** 4.256** -5.274 -4.840 -4.860 
 (2.116) (2.107) (2.126) (5.547) (5.112) (5.120) 
Log firm age 3.155* 2.960 3.102 -2.677 -2.749 -2.761 
 (1.903) (1.870) (1.881) (2.427) (2.350) (2.356) 
Size 0.475 0.488 0.474 3.204*** 3.251*** 3.199*** 
 (0.560) (0.550) (0.558) (1.113) (1.078) (1.103) 
Education 2.511 2.648 2.564 1.077 2.025 1.969 
 (1.976) (1.973) (1.987) (3.473) (3.807) (3.833) 
Log experience 0.197 0.121 0.224 -2.760 -2.561 -2.553 
 (1.679) (1.631) (1.666) (1.841) (1.873) (1.880) 
Region indicators Yes Yes Yes -2.373 -2.712 -2.709 
Industry effects Yes Yes Yes 9.345* 9.125 9.165* 
Constant 6.589 7.087 6.703 0.650 6.033 6.786 
 (7.900) (7.867) (7.896) (9.078) (11.95) (11.76) 
       
Observations 220 220 220 252 252 252 





Table 9. Impact of political connections on access to bank loans in firms with 
external financing needs  
The dependent variable Bankloan is a dummy variable which takes the value of one 
if the firm has a bank loan as of early 2003. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are 
in brackets. ***, **, * indicate statistically significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, 
respectively. Wald-test is a statistic to test the hypothesis that all the explanatory variables 
are jointly zero. Model (1)-(3) reports the results for private firms. Model (4)-(6) report 
the results for SOEs. 
   Bankloan  
  Private   SOE  
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Party leader 0.562*  0.740* 0.170  0.0866 
 (0.317)  (0.393) (0.297)  (0.340) 
Party member  0.0922 -0.254  0.323 0.259 
  (0.270) (0.337)  (0.456) (0.523) 
Sales growth 0.0161 0.0185 0.0148 -0.030 -0.029 -0.030 
 (0.0346) (0.0341) (0.0345) (0.0975) (0.0974) (0.0975) 
ROA 0.433 0.416 0.420 0.971 0.914 0.936 
 (0.486) (0.480) (0.484) (1.330) (1.293) (1.308) 
Leverage -0.0346 -0.0496 -0.0625 -0.372 -0.385 -0.380 
 (0.461) (0.468) (0.464) (0.417) (0.417) (0.417) 
Log length 0.130 0.170 0.135 0.155 0.162 0.156 
 (0.229) (0.228) (0.232) (0.163) (0.163) (0.163) 
Audit 0.698*** 0.750*** 0.701*** -0.292 -0.287 -0.294 
 (0.270) (0.270) (0.270) (0.338) (0.335) (0.338) 
Log firm age -0.208 -0.162 -0.213 0.217 0.218 0.218 
 (0.290) (0.287) (0.289) (0.165) (0.165) (0.165) 















-0.720* -0.727* -0.737* 
 (0.343) (0.352) (0.349) (0.425) (0.421) (0.424) 
Log experience 0.000953 0.0318 -0.00603 0.148 0.147 0.144 
 (0.272) (0.271) (0.270) (0.186) (0.187) (0.187) 
       
Industry effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Region indicator Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 358 358 358 403 403 403 
p-value of 
Wald-test 





Table 10. Impact of political connections on access to bank loans in different regions 
The dependent variable Bankloan is a dummy variable which takes the value of one 
if the firm has a bank loan as of early 2003. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are 
in brackets. ***, **, * indicate statistically significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, 
respectively. Model (1)-(5) report results of the same regression in five regions. 












Party leader 0.698 2.212*** 1.185** 4.074** 16.18 
 (0.707) (0.694) (0.552) (1.720) (0) 
Sales growth 0.00146 -0.0542 0.138* -0.357** -2.771 
 (0.0305) (0.0853) (0.0758) (0.151) (0) 
ROA 1.475 0.0584 0.953 -1.224 366.4 
 (1.369) (0.884) (0.742) (4.933) (0) 
Leverage -1.052 0.828 -0.294 1.250 -2.097* 
 (1.074) (1.143) (0.710) (1.791) (1.210) 
Log length 0.207 -0.00918 0.0149 -3.125** -29.07 
 (0.496) (0.411) (0.422) (1.508) (0) 
Audit 0.179 0.174 0.875* 5.207*** 42.64 
 (0.606) (0.667) (0.470) (1.581) (0) 
Log firm age -0.874 -1.074 1.304** -2.352*** 43.81 
 (0.619) (0.668) (0.591) (0.834) (0) 
Size 0.634*** 0.464** 0.160 1.210*** 9.937* 
 (0.210) (0.231) (0.152) (0.414) (5.294) 
Education -2.502*** -0.976* -0.371 -4.760***  
 (0.871) (0.583) (0.589) (1.573)  
Log experience 0.526 0.598 -0.125 -0.559 -4.771 
 (0.601) (0.579) (0.420) (0.910) (16.66) 
      
Industry effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 113 106 171 63 20 
p-value of 
Wald-test 













Table 11. Probit regression-the likelihood that a firm has political connections 
The dependent variable Party leader is a dummy variable equal to one if the general 
manager is a Party leader. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are in brackets. ***, 
**, * indicate statistically significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 (1) (2) 
Variable Party Leader Party Leader 
Log firm age 0.409***  
 (0.118)  
Log experience 0.205* 0.277** 
 (0.115) (0.113) 
Education 0.270* 0.156 
 (0.152) (0.153) 
Log assets  0.0848** 
  (0.0366) 
Constant -2.416*** -2.357*** 
 (0.341) (0.383) 





Table 12. Robustness check-Heckman’s lambda approach 
P1 is Heckman’s lambda from the previous step. The dependent variable Bankloan 
(column 1) is a dummy variable which takes the value of one if the firm has a bank loan 
as of early 2003. The dependent variable Numbank is a categorical variable which takes 
the value 0 if a firm does not do business with any bank; 1 if a firm does business with 
one to three banks; 2 if a firm does business with more than three banks. The dependent 
variable Collateral (column 3) is a dummy variable which takes the value of 1 if the firm 
is required to put collateral in obtaining the bank loans. Colvalue (column 4) is the value 
of collateral required as percentage of loan value. Maturity (column 5) is the average 
duration (measured in months) of long-term loans reported by firms. All regressions 
include industry and region dummies. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are in 
brackets. ***, **, * indicate statistically significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, 
respectively. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Variable Bankloan Numbank Collateral Colvalue Maturity 
Party leader 0.636*** 0.433 0.398** 3.621 -2.368 
 (0.173) (0.389) (0.162) (8.256) (2.203) 
P1 -6.483 9.440 -2.293 250.0 31.03 
 (5.415) (13.10) (5.129) (289.3) (58.67) 
Sales growth 0.000625 0.00297 0.00998 -1.133 0.378 
 (0.0167) (0.0361) (0.0139) (0.978) (0.272) 
ROA 0.383 -0.152 0.598** 5.857 -0.988 
 (0.285) (0.751) (0.288) (12.77) (2.600) 
Leverage 0.0742 0.0293 0.121 -6.972 5.127 
 (0.230) (0.516) (0.205) (12.47) (3.546) 
Log length -0.0683 1.348*** 0.0760 7.152 -0.332 
 (0.126) (0.258) (0.110) (7.975) (1.323) 
Audit 0.241* 1.214*** 0.135 11.79 4.284** 
 (0.145) (0.365) (0.129) (7.727) (2.141) 
Log firm age 0.648 -1.973 0.283 -42.93 -0.292 
 (0.623) (1.464) (0.583) (33.60) (6.738) 
Size 0.209*** 0.225** 0.278*** -1.610 0.482 
 (0.0477) (0.108) (0.0439) (2.438) (0.560) 
Education -0.118 -0.436 -0.219 -17.43 0.429 
 (0.402) (0.962) (0.377) (21.43) (4.564) 
Log experience 0.412 -0.474 0.0566 -29.77* -1.380 
 (0.300) (0.723) (0.284) (16.63) (3.302) 
Region indicators Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant -3.674***  -3.032*** 207.7*** 12.77 
 (1.198)  (1.124) (65.49) (13.23) 
Observations 525 577 577 191 220 
R-squared    0.253 0.204 
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Table 13. Impact of non-connected lending to private firms on GDP growth 
The dependent variables are GDP growth rate in 15 provinces in 2003 and 2004 
respectively. GDP per capita is GDP divided by the population of the province in 2002. X 
is the percentage of private firms that have bank loans but without party connections.  
Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are in brackets. ***, **, * indicate statistically 
significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 























0.863 3.720 2.640 0.947* 5.267 3.651 
 (0.578) (6.921) (3.612) (0.480) (5.307) (2.392) 
Log(GDP 
per capita) 
   0.122 2.255*** 1.472*** 
    (0.0905) (0.621) (0.331) 
Constant 0.202** 10.67*** 12.12*** -0.892 -9.586* -1.103 
 (0.0908) (0.820) (0.516) (0.783) (5.347) (2.946) 
       
Observa- 
tions 
15 15 15 15 15 15 
R-squared 0.215 0.035 0.046 0.320 0.347 0.397 
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 Figure 1. GDP growth rate (2003) and non-connected lending 
    Res1 are the residuals obtained from regressing GDP growth rate in 2003 on GDP 
per capita in 2002. Res3 are the residuals from regressing the percentage of 
non-connected lending on GDP per capita in 2002. Res1 is plotted against Res3, which 
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Figure 2. GDP growth rate (2004) and non-connected lending 
    Res2 are the residuals obtained from regressing GDP growth rate in 2004 on GDP 
per capita in 2002. Res3 are the residuals from regressing the residuals from regressing 
the percentage of non-connected lending on GDP per capita in 2002. Res2 is plotted 
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